Demand Heterogeneity and Policy Mix:A Consideration of the Effect of Macroeconomic Policy with the Disparity in Price Elasticity among Entities by unknown
 0 
 
 
Demand Heterogeneity and Policy Mix: 
A Consideration of the Effect of Macroeconomic Policy 
 with the Disparity in Price Elasticity among Entities 
 
 
 
 
Yasuko Ishiguro  
School of Economics, University of Hyogo 
Kobe, Japan 
 
November, 2017 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We introduce the disparity in price elasticity between government demand and consumption 
demand into a simple money-in-the-utility-function model. This extension demonstrates 
that fiscal policies have a positive, negative, or neutral effect on production. We show that 
the effect of a fiscal policy financed by seigniorage depends on the value of Marshallian k 
and the scale of seigniorage in addition to the disparity in price elasticity between economic 
entities. Moreover, the effect on production depends on how expansionary and 
contractionary policies are combined. We then demonstrate that the welfare effect of fiscal 
policy depends on the attitudes of household labour supply.   
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Demand Heterogeneity and Policy Mix: 
A Consideration of the Effect of Macroeconomic Policy 
 with the Disparity in Price Elasticity among Entities 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fiscal and monetary policies are the main interests of macroeconomics. 
Cash-in-advance and money-in-the-utility-function (MIU) models have recently been built 
for theoretical macroeconomic analyses with money. In classical models, the CES or 
Cobb–Douglas utility function is often used. Due to the weak separability of these utility 
functions, demand shocks have no room to exist under flexible pricing. In classical theories, 
only supply side shocks such as productivity shocks can affect output levels. Because of the 
Lehman shock, however, economic theories are expected to explain how monetary situations 
can affect real output. Consequently, the neo-classical analysis now includes an imperfection 
in money markets to consider the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies on output 
levels. On the other hand, Keynesian-type models use similar utility functions with price 
rigidity to examine the effects of aggregate demand policies.1 In the conventional literature, 
the assumption of price rigidity or the imperfection in money markets is assumed to show 
that demand shocks affect output. However, a few analyses focus on the mechanism of 
demand shock affecting production through the price distortion in monopolistic competition 
instead of an imperfection in money markets or price rigidity.2  
Firms or labour unions have the initiative in determining the level of production or real 
wage rates when competition is imperfect. For example, when firms have monopolistic 
power due to an imperfection in a goods market, the price and quantity of production are 
dependent on the value of the market’s price elasticity. When price elasticity is low, firms 
have an incentive to produce less and set higher prices. When the price elasticity of goods is 
identical between buyers, firms do not care who buys but do care about demand size. 
However, if price elasticity is not identical across demand sectors, such as consumption and 
government spending, the demand share also becomes important for firms because reactions 
to price changes differ between consumers and governments. When the demand share with 
low price elasticity is high, the price elasticity of the whole market is low, giving firms great 
                                                
1 Under the assumption of price rigidity, New Keynesian studies indicate that a fiscal policy or tax 
increase is followed by labour supply changes due to the income or assets effect. The heterogeneity of 
goods or households with liquidity constraints under the price rigidity condition also leads to policy 
effectiveness. 
2 One of the few analyses is a series of studies by Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011) shows that an expansionary 
fiscal policy financed by seigniorage can increase consumption, producing ex post price rigidity via 
dynamic optimization. 
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monopolistic power. In this case, the firm sets its price high and production volume low. 
However, if the demand share with high price elasticity is large, the whole market price 
elasticity is high. Then, the more competitive market condition creates a low price and high 
production level. Therefore, the equilibrium output level depends on the share of government 
out of total demand. Dixon (1990), Dixon and Rankin (1994), and Jacobsen and Schultz 
(1994) conducted analyses in which fluctuations in price elasticity due to a change in 
demand share affect production.3 When prices are high, households tend to give up spending, 
leading to a high price elasticity of consumption. Furthermore, as a government’s 
expenditures follow its budget plan, it may purchase cheaper goods but rarely ceases 
purchasing altogether, leading to low price elasticity. These analyses show that increases in 
government expenditure negatively affect production when the price elasticity of 
government demand is lower than that of private demand because the price elasticity of the 
whole market declines. This corresponds to a non-Keynesian effect which is detected by 
many empirical analyses.4,5  
This study extends the macro analysis by focusing on differences in price elasticity 
among entities that have not attracted much attentions. We consider the impacts of 
increasing the money supply carried out with fiscal policy simultaneously. If real 
government spending is constant in the MIU model with the assumption of price flexibility, 
the money is neutral and does not affect production. In case that nominal government 
spending is constant, however, an increase in the money supply increases the price levels, 
thus reducing the government’s demand for goods. Therefore, the effect of an expansionary 
monetary policy is equal to that of a contractionary fiscal policy. Thus, the policies’ effects 
may cancel each other out when occurring simultaneously. Japan has seen quantitative 
monetary easing and budget deficits for a long time, but its economic growth rate remains 
low. On the other hand, in developed countries such as Europe and the United States, 
contractionary fiscal policies and expansionary monetary policies have been implemented to 
reduce government budget deficits after the Lehman shock. However, an increased (not 
reduced) growth rate has been observed in these countries since the start of the fiscal 
consolidation. 
This study considers fiscal policy by examining the mechanism arising from 
differences in price elasticity between economic entities without assuming an imperfection 
                                                
3 Gali (1994,1995) argued that private investment reflects fluctuations in price elasticity in the market 
which affects the dynamics of capital accumulation, indicating multiple steady states and equilibrium 
paths. 
4 In the non-Keynesian effect of fiscal policy, fiscal contraction induces increases in output. 
5 For example, Risquete and Hernandez (2015) identified the existence of the non-Keynesian effect in EU 
15 countries. Afonso and Sousa (2012) showed that fiscal expenditures in Germany and Italy reduce 
production and consumption. Rzonca and Cizkowicz (2005) found that fiscal consolidation in the second 
half of the 1990s positively affected GDP and private expenditures in Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, and 
Latvia. 
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in money markets or price rigidity, and investigates the effects of the monetary fiscal policy 
mix. This study introduces the disparity in price elasticity between government and 
consumption demand into a simple monopolistic competitive model with money, as 
constructed by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Startz (1989). 
First, we show that fiscal policy has positive, negative, or neutral effects on production 
in this simple model, though the Cambridge cash-balance equation is kept strictly under 
flexible pricing. Next, we show that expansionary monetary policies have effects opposite to 
those of expansionary fiscal policies under an identical condition. Moreover, the effect of a 
fiscal policy financed by seigniorage depends on the value of Marshallian k and the scale of 
money creation in addition to the disparity in price elasticity between economic entities. We 
also consider the effects of the monetary fiscal policy mix, finding that the effect on 
production depends on how expansionary and contractionary policies are combined. We 
further demonstrate that fiscal policy reduces the welfare of households who supply no 
labour when output increases. Focusing on interactions between monetary and fiscal policies 
arising from differences in price elasticity between economic entities, we also construct a 
simple model in which the other mechanisms generate nothing.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the static 
monopolistically competitive model on which our analysis is based. Section 3 describes the 
effect of macroeconomic policy according to financial resources, and the effect of the policy 
mix. Section 4 considers economic welfare. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions and 
considers several implications of the study. 
 
 
2. MODEL 
 
2.1. Structure of the model 
We construct the static model of monopolistic competition following Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987) and Startz (1989). A continuum of goods is indexed by h∈[0,1], each 
variety of which is produced by monopolistically competitive firm h. Let us suppose that the 
firms’ production functions are identical. The only factor of production, labour, is supplied 
by households indexed by i∈[0,1]. The government produces governmental goods 
distributed to households equally.  Households make consumption and real money balance 
decisions and choose whether to supply one unit of labour or not.  Households receive 
profits and wages from firms. 
 
2.2. Government 
Since goods supplied by the government such as compulsory education, childcare, and 
medical care, are characterized by excludability and competitiveness, they can be seen as 
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goods supplied by the private sector.6 However, without government provision of those 
goods, total supply will not meet basic social welfare needs. Therefore, the government bears 
the cost of providing basic human needs of those goods to households. The government 
purchases varieties to produce the goods and distributes them to households equally. The 
government’s production function is 
 g
g dhX hG

/11/11
0
/11

 

     ,  σg>1,                          (1) 
where σg is the elasticity of substitution among goods in composite goods production.7 
Denoting government spending by G, the government demand for good h, ηh is 
gg
hGh pGP
  1 , 
 g
g dhpP hG
 


  1/110 1 ,          (2) 
where PG is the government’s price index. Eq. (2) shows that σg is the price elasticity of 
government demand for each good. The government budget constraint is 
MTGXPdhp GGhh 10  ，                         (3) 
where ΔM is the amount of newly issued currency and T is tax income from households. T 
takes a negative sign for lump-sum transfers to households. 
 
2.3. Households 
The utility function of household i is 
  ii
C
i
GiCii P
MXXu 

 



1
1 ,              (4) 
 c
c dhcX hiCi
 /11/11
0
/11

 

  ,  σｃ>1 , 
where chi is the consumption of good h by household i, and XGi are the goods distributed to 
household i by the government. M1i is the demand for the nominal money balance by 
household i, and σc is the household’s elasticity of substitution among goods and identical 
across households.8 PC is the consumer’s price index, defined as 
                                                
6 These types of goods are not categorized as public goods by the standard definition. They are called 
‘merit goods’ by Musgrave. 
7 For example, consider to provide the compulsory education service fulfilling the requirements. A 
government does not distribute desks textbooks and so on to each household but to produce educational 
services systematically by using them. In the case that the private sector fulfils the same educational 
requirement, it buys materials and composes them to consume. But the elasticity of substitution among 
goods in private sector σc would likely differ from that in government sector σg because the regulations and 
laws the government must follow differ from those the private must obey. 
8 The elasticity of substitution between goods is not important to the main result for policy effects 
because the real values depend on government share in goods demand, which is a function of the GM 
ratio. The appendix shows that the results do not change when XG is assumed to be wasteful and not to be 
substituted for XC. 
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 c
c dhpP hC
 


  1/110 1 .   (5) 
δi is a definition function set to one when a household supplies labour and zero otherwise. 
The disutility from working for household i is equal to βθi. Let us assume that θi follows the 
uniform distribution n(θi) below: 
  1,0In i  .                   (6) 
An economy with a large β value experiences high disutility from work. Let us suppose that 
household utility functions are identical, except for θi. The nominal expenditure of household 
i Ei is then 
ihihi MdhcpE 1
1
0   .                   (7) 
Household i’s budget constraint is 
iihiii MtdhwE 0
1
0                                     (8) 
where M0i is the nominal money balance that household i originally held, πhi denotes the 
profit of firm h distributed to household i, and ti is the tax payment of household i expressed 
as 
       Tditi 10 .                                               (9) 
Solving household’s utility maximization problem produces the demand of good h, chi, and 
the demand of the real money balance M1i/p:9 
c
C
h
Cihi P
pXc




 ,      Gi
C
i
Ci XP
EX   1 ,                   (10) 
  


  Gi
C
i
C
i X
P
E
P
M 11 .                    (11) 
The price elasticity of consumption demand for each good is equal to σc, which is not always 
equal to the price elasticity of government demand σg. 
The indirect utility function iu is expressed as follows: 
    iiGi
C
iihii
i XP
Mtdhw
Aiu  










  0
1
0 ,        11A .   (12) 
For each household, the supply/non-supply of labour becomes indifferent when the 
following equation holds: 
                                                
9 Because XCi and XGi are perfect substitute, each household regards the free receipt of government goods 
as income of the same value, as shown in Eq. (10). 
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



















 
Gi
C
iihi
iGi
C
iihi
X
P
Mtdh
AX
P
Mtdhw
A
0
1
00
1
0  .  (13) 
Then, the following equation is derived: 
C
i P
wA
  .                         (14) 
Consequently, each household’s attitude to labour supply can be determined the using the 
equation below, depending on each household’s value for θi:10 
C
i P
wA
   ⇒ 1i ， Ci P
wA
   ⇒ 0i .      (15) 
The total labour supply of economy Ls is 
   110   CiS P
wAdiL  .                    (16) 
Eq. (16) shows that total labour supply depends positively only on the real wage rate. 
Income changes such as tax increases do not affect labour supply or production. 
 
2.4. Firms 
Firm h produces good h by increasing return technology. The production function of 
firm h is  
  hh yl  , 0 ,  0 ,
    (17) 
where lh is the amount of labour employed by firm h, and yh is the output of firm h, which is 
equal to the sum of household and government demand, expressed as 
hhh cy  ,   10 dicc hih .   (18) 
The profits of Firm h, πh, are expressed as 
   hhhhhh cwcp   .     (19) 
Each firm sets a price to maximize its profits πh. The first-order condition for profit 
maximization is 
       hghc
h
ghch ggp
wgg   1111 ,  
hh
h
h c
g 

  (20) 
where gh denotes the government’s share of the demand for good h. Let us assume Eq. (21) 
as the production function satisfying Eq. (17): 
a
hh yl  , 10  a .   (21) 
                                                
10 Though the household is indifferent to working when equality holds, I assume that it supplies one unit 
of labour. 
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Then, a is a positive parameter indicating the degree of scale economy; the greater the value 
of a, the smaller the scale economy. The inverse demand function for labour is obtained as 
follows: 
a
a
h
mh
mh
h
l
ap
w  111 

,    ghchmh gg   1 ,      (22) 
where σmh is the price elasticity of the whole market for good h, defined by the average of σc 
and σg weighted by their market shares. Considering the production function, we obtain 
mhhhh a
ypwl 1 ,  
mh
mh
mh 
 1 ,  amh  0 ,    (23) 


  mhhhh ayp 
11 .      (24) 
Here, μmh/a is the labour share. We assume that this condition is satisfied.11 Moreover, μmh is 
a variable indicating the monopolistic power of firm h, which increases as μmh approaches 
zero and lower as it approaches one. 
The clearing condition of the money market is 
   11 MXPE GC  ,    diEE i 10 .     (25) 
The household budget constraint in this economy as a whole is expressed as 
0MTwLE
S  ,   didh hih   1010  .     (26) 
Since all firms are symmetrical, PC= PG=ph, indicated as p hereafter. 
 
2.5. Equilibrium 
The total labour demand of the economy is 
a
a
m
h
D a
p
wdhlL




  110  .     (27) 
The equilibrium of labour is obtained by substituting Eq. (27) into Eq. (16):12 
12** 


 a
a
ma
AL      1
12* 


 a
a
ma
Aif                      (28a) 
1* L          1
12* 


 a
a
ma
Aif                    (28b) 
                                                
11 μmh<a ⇔ σm(1a)<1. When this inequality is not satisfied, Eq. (20) denotes the profit- minimizing 
condition because the scale of economy is too large. 
12 The sufficient condition for labour market stability     0/  SD LLpw is a>1/2. It is assumed that 
this condition is satisfied hereafter. 
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Variables with * represent equilibrium values. Eq. (28b) indicates the case where all labour is 
employed. This section focuses on the case where not all labour is supplied, expressed by Eq. 
(28a).  Eq. (28a) indicates that the equilibrium output level depends on μm, i.e., firms’ 
monopolistic power. Given the symmetric equilibrium and definition of g(=XG/y), we obtain 
  aGLXg /1**  . (29) 
From Eqs. (21), (25), and (26) and the government’s budget constraints, we obtain Eq. (30) 
at the equilibrium: 
  *11* /1 pML a  .     (30) 
Eq. (30) shows that a higher real money balance corresponds to a higher output level. 
In this model, the Cambridge cash-balance equation is held strictly where (1α)/α 
represents Marshallian k. Eqs. (28a),(29), and (30) show that the equilibrium values of 
government share, output level, and real money supply depend on supply of government 
goods XG, while price depends on the nominal money supply M1.  XG and M1 are policy 
variablesthe model parameters. As shown in Eq. (30), a change in government spending 
XG affects government share g*. Eq. (23) shows that μm is a positive function of σm, which is 
the average of σc and σg weighted by their market share. Unless the price elasticity of the 
government’s demand σg is equal to that of consumption σc, changes in the share of the 
government’s demand g* influences monopolistic power and alters output.  
 
FIGURE 1. 
 
 
3. POLICY EFFECTS 
 
This section first checks how fiscal policies financed by taxes affect the share of the 
government’s demand g*, then investigates the effect on output. Next, we consider monetary 
policies with constant nominal government spending G. We also investigate the effects of 
fiscal policies financed by money creation and tax. Finally, the effects of a monetary fiscal 
policy mix are examined. 
 
3.1. Effect of increased government goods supply financed by taxes 
The effects of an increase in the supply of government goods XG occur in two stages. 
The first affects government share g*, and the second produces changes in g* on the firm’s 
monopolistic power. The effect of increased government goods supply financed by taxes on 
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government share g* are as follows: 
   01 1 **
*




yBgdX
dg
gcG  ，    0112
1  mma
B  .  (31) 
The brace in the denominator of Eq. (31) expresses a multiplier of a change in government 
share g*; we assume that 1>|(σcσg)B|.13 Because this condition is fulfilled, the increased 
government goods increases government share g*. 
An increased government goods supply financed by taxes has the following effects: 
  00*** 


 gc
G
gc
G dX
dgBaL
dX
dL  ,        (32) 
  00*** 


 gc
G
Ggc
G
G dX
dgBX
p
X
dX
dp  .    (33) 
An increased supply of government goods XG increases the share of government demand g*.  
When σg>σc, the firm’s monopolistic power declines (as μm rises). The firm increases its 
output level and cuts its prices. By contrast, when σg<σc, the increase in the government 
share strengthens firm’s monopolistic power (as μm falls). Firms raise prices and reduce 
output, thus displaying the non-Keynesian effect of fiscal policy. 
  The mechanism of the supply of government goods XG affecting output levels in this 
analysis is based on changes in firms’ monopolistic power due to a change in the 
composition of goods demand. This is a different mechanism of changes in productivity or 
income or in asset effects that alter the labour supply. When σg=σc, this transmission 
mechanism does not. The production level does not change, and consumption is crowded 
out; thus, the classical case occurs. Therefore, fiscal policy has positive, negative, or neutral 
effects on production in this simple model, though the Cambridge cash-balance equation is 
kept strictly under flexible pricing. These results were ontained by Dixon (1990), Dixon and 
Rankin (1994), and Jacobsen and Schultz (1994). 
The policy’s effect on consumption is 
    0111 *
**


Bg
Bg
dX
dX
gc
gc
G
C


．     (34) 
When σg=σc, consumption is crowded out completely (dXC=dXG) because output does not 
                                                
13 When σg്σc, an increase in government share g changes the firm’s monopolistic power (μm), 
causing a change in output. This proceeds further changes in g. Therefore, a multiplier process occurs. The 
condition on which this multiplier process converges is that the absolute value of common ratio 
|(σcσg)gB| is less than one. We assume that one of its sufficient conditions |(σcσg)B| is satisfied hereafter. 
With this condition, a multiplier process induced by an increase in XC via a change in income converges 
as well. 
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change. In this case, direct crowding out occurs due to perfect substitutability between XG 
and XC.14 When σg<σc, consumption declines more than the increase in government goods 
supply (dXC>dXG) because output decreases. By contrast, when σg>σc, the firm increases its 
output and consumption is partially crowded out. Consumption declines less than the 
increase in government goods supply (dXC<dXG). In this case, dXC+dXG>0. Because XC and 
XG are perfect substitutes, households’ utility level may increase. Section 4 considers the 
policies’ welfare effects. 
 
TABLE 1. Effects of fiscal policy financed by taxes 
 
3.2. Monetary policy with constant nominal government spending 
A change in nominal money supply M1 with a constant supply of government goods XG 
does not change the government share in goods market g*, while prices rise. Therefore, the 
production level is unchanged.15 Monetary policy has no effect in this model. However, in 
case that the nominal money supply increases under constant nominal government spending 
G, government purchase quantity decreases, affecting g* via price changes. As preparation 
for the analysis of a policy mix, let us investigate the effects of an increase in nominal 
money supply under constant nominal government expenditure. We can rewrite Eq. (29) as 
follows: 
1
* 1
M
Gg 
 .                  (35) 
Therefore, an increase in the nominal money supply M1 with constant nominal government 
spending G reduces the government share g*:   
0
1
**
1




M
g
dM
dg
.                (36) 
As shown in Eq. (38), an increase in M1 raises prices. With constant nominal government 
spending, the government’s goods market share declines because the government’s purchase 
quantity decreases. 
Changes in the nominal money supply with a constant G affect output and prices as 
follows:    01
**
1 M
BgaL
dM
dL gc 
 gc  

 ,          (37) 
       01 *1
1
 Bg
p
M
dM
dp
gc  .               (38) 
                                                
14 Although XGi is wasteful in the model in the appendix, the fiscal policy crowds out consumption 
completely. This crowding out that is induced by an increase in goods prices is indirect. 
15 Therefore, money is neutral. 
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When σg=σc, the output level is unchanged because the government’s share does not affect 
firms’ monopolistic power. The price’s change rate is equal to that of the nominal money 
supply. In this case, the classical case occurs. 
When σg≠σc, employment and output change, and the price’s change rate differs from 
that of the nominal money supply. Because government share g* decreases, when σg>σc, 
firms’ monopolistic power is enhanced (as μm falls), reducing output. The change rate of 
prices is greater than that of the nominal money supply. By contrast, when σg<σc, firms’ 
monopolistic power declines (as μm rises), increasing firms’ output. Prices’ change rate is 
smaller than that of the nominal money supply. Production changes arise because the 
government purchases fewer goods due to increased good market prices. Therefore, the way 
of expansionary monetary policy affects output under a constant G is equal to that of 
contractionary fiscal policy financed by taxes. 
 
TABLE 2. Effects of monetary policy with constant nominal government spending 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show how the effects of expansionary monetary policies are opposite to 
those of expansionary fiscal policies financed by taxes under identical conditions. 
 
3.3. Fiscal policy financed by seigniorage and taxes 
A fiscal policy financed by seigniorage is equal to the simultaneous implementation 
of an expansionary fiscal policy financed by taxes and an expansionary monetary policy with 
a constant G because government spending increases with an expansion of the nominal 
money supply. As shown, when the values of price elasticity differ between economic 
entities, the effects of an expansionary monetary policy under a constant G are equal to those 
of a contractionary fiscal policy financed by taxes. Therefore, a fiscal policy financed by 
seigniorage is equal to the joint implementation of expansionary and contractionary fiscal 
policies. This subsection investigates which effect dominates when fiscal policy is financed 
by both money creation and taxes. For calculative convenience, we consider nominal 
government spending G(=pXG) instead of the supply of government goods XG. 
Proportion τ of fiscal policy costs are financed by taxes and proportion 1τ by 
seigniorage.  
   dGdGdMdTdGpXd G   11 . 
The analysis in the previous subsection is the case where τ=1. The case where τ=0 reflects a 
fiscal policy financed by seigniorage only. 
Eq. (35) shows that government share g* is expressed as a product of the GM ratio and 
Marshallian k. First, the effects of an increase in government spending financed by 
seigniorage and taxes on government share g* are 
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 
1
** 1
M
gk
dG
dg 


 .                             (39) 
When τ=1, that is fiscal policy is financed by taxes, the increase in nominal government 
spending (dG) raises government share g*, thus k/M1. The increase in the nominal money 
supply ((1τ)dG) reduces g*, thus g*(1τ)/M1. The effect of an increase in government 
spending financed by seigniorage on government share g* is equal to the sum of the effects 
of the two joint policies: a tax-financed fiscal policy and the increase in nominal money 
supply. When the fiscal policy’s effect dominates (i.e. k>g*(1τ)), government share g* 
increases. When the effect of the increase in nominal money supply dominates (i.e. 
k<g*(1τ)), g* decreases. 
A fiscal policy financed by seigniorage and tax has the following effects: 
      01*1
**
 gk
M
BaL
dG
dL
gc      01*  gcgk  ,  (40) 
      Bgk
M
p
dG
dp
gc   11 *
1
**
 
    01*  gcgk  .  (41) 
When the expansionary fiscal policy’s effect dominates (i.e. k>g*(1τ)), the effect on output 
is equal to the effect of fiscal policy financed by taxes (see Table 1). By contrast, when the 
effect of the increase in nominal money supply dominates (i.e. k<g*(1τ)), the effect on 
output is equal to the effect of monetary policy with fixed nominal government spending 
(see Table 2). Therefore, under simultaneous expansionary fiscal and expansionary monetary 
policies (as in Japan after the Lehman shock), a change in production may be small because 
the policies’ effects cancel each other out.16 Moreover, a non-Keynesian effect of fiscal 
policy will occur when σg>σc aside from when σg<σc. The classical case occurs not only 
when σg=σc but also when k=g*(1τ), where the monetary and fiscal policies’ effects are 
cancelled out completely. These results are summarized in Table 3. 
The impact of the government spending increase on prices depends on the relative 
effects of inflation due to the increase in the nominal money supply, shown in the first term 
in the bracket on the right-hand side of Eq. (41), and the change in the firm’s monopolistic 
power, shown in the second term in the bracket. When monopolistic power increases, prices 
tend to rise. In this case, then, prices rise through both effects. If σg=σc as well, the price’s 
change rate is equal to that of the nominal money supply. 
As the change rate of nominal government spending is divided into the rates of prices 
and government goods supply, we obtain the latter as follows: 
                                                
16 Section 5 briefly discusses policy mixes in Japan and U.K after the Lehman shock and in the U.S. in 
the early days of Reaganomics. 
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         10111 *** gkBggkkXGdGdX gcGG .  (42) 
When the effect of fiscal policy dominates (i.e. k>g*(1τ)), government goods supply 
increases. By contrast, when the effect of the increase in nominal money supply dominates 
(i.e. k<g*(1τ)), government goods supply declines. 
The effect on consumption is as follows: 
   Bg
dG
dgy
dG
dX
gc
C  

 *11
*
*
*
 .     (43). 
Because the sign in the bracket on the right-hand side of Eq. (43) is positive, the effect on 
consumption is opposite to that on government goods supply. When k>g*(1τ), consumption 
decreases. When k<g*(1τ), consumption increases. When fiscal policy is financed by taxes 
only, consumption decreases. However, when government covers the expenses of fiscal 
policy for not only taxation but for money creation, consumption increases under some 
conditions. The disparity in price elasticity between government demand and consumption 
demand affects only the scale of consumption changes. 
   
TABLE 3. Effects of fiscal policy financed by seigniorage and taxes 
 
1τ expresses the scale of monetary policy to that of fiscal policy. When 1τ>1, the 
scale of expansionary monetary policy is larger than that of fiscal policy. When 1τ<0, an 
expansionary fiscal policy and a contractionary monetary policy are carried out 
simultaneously.17 When a contractionary fiscal policy (dG<0) and expansionary monetary 
policy (1τ<0) are carried out simultaneously (as in the U.K. and U.S. during fiscal 
consolidation after the Lehman shock), the government share falls. When σg<σc, as is 
common, output increases. In the reverse combination, under a simultaneous expansionary 
fiscal policy and contractionary monetary policy (as in the early stages of Reaganomics), the 
government share rises and output decreases if σg<σc.  
 
 
4. WELFARE ANALYSIS 
 
When production changes as a result of fiscal policy, real wages and real profits also 
change. As shown clearly in Eq. (16), an increase in labour supply raises real wages.18 As 
seen in Eq. (24), on the other hand, the ratio of distribution to profits decreases when 
                                                
17 As 1τ expresses the scale of monetary policy to that of fiscal policy, τ=3 in the case of monetary 
relaxation at twice the scale of government expenditure dG<0. 
18 Since labour demand depends on real wages and the firm’s monopolistic power μm, the labour demand 
curve shifts according to the change in μm. Therefore, no one-to-one correspondence occurs between real 
wages and employment amounts. 
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production increases. Whether real profits increase or not depends on the monopolistic 
power of a firm.  Where the firm’s monopoly power is low (i.e. μm> 1/2), real profits fall. 
Where monopoly power is high (i.e. μm<1/2), real profits increase. Therefore, the welfare 
effect of a fiscal policy differs between households that supply labour to receive profits and 
wages and households that do not supply labour but receive only profits. This section 
compares economic welfare effects between such households.  
Considering Eqs. (12), (23), and (24) and the government’s budget constraint, the 
change in the economic welfare of households supplying labour is shown as Eq. (44), and 
that in the economic welfare of households who do not supply labour is shown as Eq. (45).  
    

 

 

 k
LdG
dgBAy
dG
iud
mmgc
*
*
*
*
* 111  ,  (44) 
     k
dG
dgBAy
dG
iud
mgc 

 *
*
* 21  .        (45) 
The right-hand sides of Eqs. (44) and (45) are the same except within the brackets. The sign 
of the bracket on the right-hand side of Eq. (44) is always positive. Therefore, when 
production increases ((σcσg)(dg/dG)*<0), the economic welfare of households providing 
labour increases. On the other hand, in Eq. (45), the sign of the bracket is either positive or 
negative. In the positive case, the change in economic welfare is the same as that for 
labour-supply households; in the negative case, the change in welfare is reversed. When 
μm*<1/2, where the firm’s monopoly power is high, the sign in parentheses is positive, and 
welfare increases due to the increase in production regardless of whether labour is supplied 
or not. On the other hand, when μm*>1/2, in the case that real profits decline, the sign of the 
bracket in Eq. (45) is positive and welfare rises only when the value of k is sufficiently large. 
This happens because the price decrease accompanying the increase in production is large, 
and the real money balance increases, which exceeds the decrease in real profits.19 Output 
increases along with a high value of k only when (dg/dG)> 0 and σc<σg. Therefore, other than 
in this case, welfare declines, and the policy has opposed beneficial impacts depending on 
the household’s decision about whether to supply labour or not. 
   The results in this section depend largely on the assumption that XG and XC are perfect 
substitutes. As shown in the appendix, under the assumption that XG is wasteful and not 
substitutable with XC, households’ utility level is highly likely to decline even if production 
increases due to an increased supply of government goods.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                
19 From Eq. (29), d(M1/p)/dy=k; the larger k is, the more price decrease (increases in the real money 
supply) accompany y increases. 
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We demonstrate that a macroeconomic policy affects production if we introduce the 
disparity in price elasticity between government demand and consumption demand. Our 
main findings are as follows. 
We show in a model that fiscal policies have positive, negative or neutral effects on 
production even if the Cambridge cash-balance equation is held strictly under flexible 
pricing, except when price elasticity values are equal between economic entities. Moreover, 
under a given nominal government spending, the effect of an expansionary monetary policy 
is equal to that of a contractionary fiscal policy because an increase in prices reduces 
government demand. Therefore, monetary and fiscal policies have opposite effects on 
production under the same condition. When fiscal policy is financed by money creation, the 
policy’s effect depends on the difference in price elasticity, as well as the relative scale of 
seigniorage g(1τ) and Marshallian k. Depending on the relative scale, the influence on 
output is positive or negative, or the effects are cancelled. The effect of a policy mix on 
production depends on how expansionary and contractionary policies are combined. If σg<σc, 
as is common, output increases when a contractionary fiscal policy and expansionary 
monetary policy are implemented simultaneously. In the reverse combination, output 
decreases. The welfare of households that supply labour is linked to changes in output, but 
the welfare of households that do not supply labour is reversed in some cases. 
This model shows that, when an expansionary fiscal policy and monetary policy are 
carried out simultaneously, most of their effects may cancel each other out. One example of 
this process is Japanese government’s substantial quantitative monetary easing and budget 
deficits since the collapse of Japan's bubble in the first half of the 1990s. In particular, over 
the nine years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (2008-2016), the money supply (M1) 
increased 1.4 times, net government debt increased 1.5 times, and the debt’s percentage of 
GDP increased from 85 % in 2008 to 120% in 2016.20 However, the average annual rate of 
GDP growth over the nine years was 0.21%. Thus, the expansion effect of both policies was 
extremely slight.21 The government share of Japan’s GDP gradually declined from 38.8% in 
2009 after the Lehman shock to 36.8% in 2016, and GDP increased by 4.4% and the GDP 
deflator fell by 1.25% over the same period. If σg<σc, as is generally the case, a decline in 
government share will accompany a production increase and price reduction in our model. It 
is interesting that the experience of the Japanese economy is the same as in this case. 
In the U.K., M1 increased 1.6 times, and net government debt increased 2.7 times over 
the nine years between the Lehman shock and 2016. However, since the beginning of fiscal 
                                                
20 Data on real GDP, and the GDP deflator, the M1change rate are taken from International Financial 
Statistics (IMF), and data on government debt and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP are taken 
from the World Economic Database (IMF) or arrived at by my own calculations using it. Data on M1 for 
the U.K. are taken from Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (OECD).  
21 The average annual growth rate of GDP in the same period is 0.7% in the US and 0.7% in the U.K.; 
Japan’s growth rate is less than one-third of those. In Japan, the GDP deflator has declined, but it has 
raised 0.8% in the US and 0.9% in the U.K. in the same period. 
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consolidation in 2010, the government share decreased to 39% in 2016 from its 2010 
maximum value of 44.5%. The growth rate was negative before the start of fiscal rebuilding 
but turned positive after 2010. A declining government share and increasing output were 
observed in the U.K. as well. On the other hand, tax cuts and high interest rate policies were 
followed in the early days of Reaganomics, from 1981 to 1982. At that time, the government 
share rose from 16.7% in 1980 to 17.5% in 1982, while the growth rate was sluggish and 
became negative in 1982. 
Because this model is a simple static model in which the bond market and investment 
are omitted, it can explain only a part of the whole. However, it provides an important 
viewpoint from which to interpret several aspects of national economies.  
Concerning fiscal policy, our findings suggest that the budget implementation rule 
affects output levels. Under a hard-and-fast rule on fiscal spending usage, the elasticity of 
substitution (i.e., price elasticity of demand) is low. On the other hand, under a flexible rule，
the elasticity of substitution may be high. Thus, the fiscal rule may affect production. 
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Appendix 
 
We assumed in the main model that XGi and XCi are perfect substitutes for households, 
as is shown in Eq.(4). The results for policy effects obtained in the main body may depend 
greatly on this assumption. In this appendix, we compare the model in the main body with a 
model in which government goods and consumer goods are not substitutable and show that 
the difference in the suppositions about substitution does not affect the equilibrium value or 
policy effects.  
If government goods are wasteful and do not affect the utility of households, the 
utility function of household i is expressed as follows: 
    ii
C
i
Cii P
MXu 

 



1
1
. 
The demand of each good h chi, and the demand of real money balance M1i/PC are as follows: 
   
c
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
 ，  
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 
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i
C
i
P
E
P
M  11 .  
The price elasticity of consumption demand for each good is σc, which is equal to that of the 
model in the main body. The indirect utility function is expressed as follows: 
    ii
C
iihii
i P
Mtdhw
Aiu  







 
  0
1
0  .  
The condition that the supply/non-supply of labour is indiscriminate for households is not 
influenced by the change of the model and is represented by Eq. (14). The total labour 
supply Ls is also given by Eq. (16). There are no changes regarding firms or government. 
Therefore, the equilibrium of labour L is obtained as in Eqs. (28a) and (28b) in the main 
body. On the other hand, from Eqs. (21), (25), and (26) and the government’s budget 
constraint, the following equation holds in equilibrium: 
     1111 MLpg a  

.        
Variables with ´ indicate the equilibrium value of the cases where government goods are 
wasteful. Marshallian k' in this case is k'=(1g)(1α)/α=(1g)k, which varies according to 
the change in the private sector share. Let us first compare equilibrium values between the case of perfect substitution and 
the case of wastefulness, when σc is equal to σg.  Because σc=σg, the price elasticity of the 
market as a whole σm is equal to σc(=σg,), and this value is the same for both models. Thus, 
monopolistic power also has the same value in both models. Thus, employment and output 
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will be equal (y*=y´) in both cases. With the same XG, the government share is equal (g*=g´). 
However, considering Eq. (43), the price level is higher than in the case of perfect 
substitution, p'=p*/(1g'). Unlike in the wasteful case, in the case of a complete substitution, 
when households receive government goods, households purchase fewer goods and the price 
level falls. 
 
TABLE A1. Equilibrium values in the case that σg=σc 
 
From definition of the government share, g´ is obtained as follows:  
   11
1
M
G
pkM
X
y
Xg GG 
 .  
The government share g´ in the appendix model is expressed as a product of the GM ratio 
and k (=(1－α)/α). 
Next, in the case where σc is slightly higher than σg, we compare how the value of 
government share g changes in each case. They are the same, as expressed as follows:22 
      gBBgd gdddg gcgg   
 1
2*
. 
Thus, the same equilibrium value is obtained in both cases even if σc്σg. 
Whether government goods are wasteful or fully substitute for consumer goods does 
not affect the equilibrium of labour employment or output level because firms decide on 
output levels according to the value of the elasticity in the goods market. 
Next, let us compare the effect of increasing the supply of government goods. The 
effect of an increase in the supply of government goods XG financed by taxes on the 
government share and employment are obtained as follows: 
  ygBdXgd gcG  

1
1
，   
   ygBaLBdXLd gc gcG 


 1 .  
These equations are equivalent to the effects in the case of the fully substitutive case shown 
in Eqs. (32) and (33). The effect of fiscal policy on consumption is expressed by Eq. (34) in 
Section 1 and is not affected by changes in assumptions because the equilibrium output is 
proportional to the GM ratio. 
The effect on prices is given below: 
  
        ygBBpygBg BgpdXpd gc gcgc gcG 





 111
11 *
.  
This differs between a wasteful case and a completely substitute case. In the case of perfect 
substitution, because households receive government goods, households’ demand for goods 
                                                
22 The same is true for cases where σg is slightly higher than σc. 
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declines, and the price level falls. 
The effect on consumption is obtained as follows, exactly as in Eq. (34). 
    Bg BgdXdX gc gcGC 




1
11
. 
In the appendix model, though government good XG is wasteful and no substitution with XC 
is assumed, the price increases due to fiscal policy and consumption are completely crowded 
out. This crowding out is thus indirect.  
On the other hand, the welfare effect of households who do not supply labour on 
economic welfare is expressed by the following equation: 
         



 kggkB
dG
dgyA
dG
iud
mgc 1121  . 
When production increases, the effects on welfare are 1) changes in profits in addition to 2) 
reduction in welfare (as government goods are wasteful) and 3) positive asset effects due to a 
price decrease. The total effect depends on the effects’ relative magnitudes. The lower the 
GM ratio, the greater the effect of 3), and welfare is likely to improve. As in the model in the 
main body, the welfare of households who supply labour is likely to increase more than that 
of households who do not because the real wage rate rises.  
Therefore, the degree of substitution of goods does not affect real values, only nominal 
values. However, the effect on economic welfare is more ambiguous than it is in the model 
used in the main body. 
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TABLE 1. Effects of fiscal policy financed by taxes 
σg>σc σg=σc σg<σc 
dL/dXG dp/dXG dXC/dXG dL/dXG dp/dXG dXC/dXG dL/dXG dp/dXG dXC/dXG 
+  Larger than  1 0 0 1  + 
Smaller than 
1 
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TABLE 2. Effects of monetary policy with constant nominal government spending 
σg>σc σg=σc σg<σc 
dL/dM (dp/dM)M/p dL/dM (dp/dM)M/p dL/dM (dp/dM)M/p 
 Larger than 1 0 1 + Smaller than 1 
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TABLE 3. Effects of fiscal policy financed by seigniorage and taxes 
 σg>σc  σg=σc  σg<σc  
 
dG
dL  
p
M
dG
dp  
dG
dXC
 
dG
dL  p
M
dG
dp  
dG
dXC  
dG
dL  
p
M
dG
dp  
dG
dXC  
k>  1g  + ?  0 1    Larger than 1   
k=  1g  0 1  0 0 1  0 0 1－τ 0 
k<  1g   Larger than 1  + 0 1  + + 
Smaller 
than 1 + 
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TABLE A1. Equilibrium values in the case that σg=σc 
σm* = σm’ L* = L’ g* = g’  gppp  1/' **  
 
 
 
